2. The relationship between transparency, whistleblowing, and public trust

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INTRODUCTION

> If our objective is transparent, accountable and honest governance – government we can trust and a private sector that is trustworthy – then clearly the less information that is kept from us, and the greater the confidence we have in its accuracy, the more likely we are to achieve our aim. Transparency has become a substitute for trust.

As stated by the late Jeremy Pope, founding managing director of Transparency International, concepts of transparency have become central to the policy debate over how to build and sustain public trust in modern institutions. With public trust under increasing pressure in most, if not all democratic systems, questions abound about how to maintain the popular faith and confidence upon which stable and effective governance depends. But has transparency really become a substitute for trust? Could it ever perform this function – or is it simply one of the necessary elements in the relationship between citizens and institutions, which influence trust? Is it true that maximum transparency is conducive to maximum trust, or does it have a more nuanced role? In either case, what is the nature of the relationship between transparency and trust?

These questions are important due to conflicting interpretations of the nature of the public's interest in transparency reforms. While civil society organizations and anti-corruption reformers may advance transparency as though there can never be enough of it, policy-makers, power-holders and institutional custodians view transparency differently. Against assumptions that maximum transparency is automatically best, the *realpolitik* of transparency reform is also clearly dominated by the natural but powerful self-interest of institutions seeking to retain or assert informational control. Somewhere in here, lie the views and interests of the public at large, about which surprisingly little is known.

This chapter uses empirical evidence of public attitudes toward a specific type of transparency reform – facilitation and protection of 'whistle-blowing' – to seek out a more complete picture of the role of transparency

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in sustaining trust. Whistleblowing is the 'disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices' under the control of that organization, 'to persons or organisations that may be able to effect action'.[3] As a process that centres on the disclosure of official information that those responsible for institutional malpractice would normally prefer to withhold, whistleblowing goes to the heart of transparency reform debates. By examining public attitudes toward whistleblowing, we can identify more precisely the values that societies attach to this type of transparency reform, as well as the relationship between transparency and public trust.

In the second section, we review the background debates around these issues. In the third section, we report on data relevant to transparency, whistleblowing and public trust from public attitudes surveys conducted in Australia and the United Kingdom in 2012, as well as a large self-selecting international sample of whistleblowers, potential whistleblowers and non-whistleblowers collected through the World Online Whistleblowing Survey (WOWS). In particular, we test the accuracy of each the views noted above: notions that trust is best served by maximum transparency, such as maximum exposure of suspected wrongdoing via unconstrained disclosure of inside information to the media or public; and notions that all disclosures are best kept within the official institutions to which they relate on the presumption that these organizations are best placed to deal with them.

In the fourth section, we look more deeply at the relationships between the way that citizens – both generally, and including whistleblowers and non-whistleblowers – answer these different questions about transparency, wrongdoing, disclosure and trust. This approach lets us better understand the role of whistleblowing as a transparency mechanism in helping sustain public trust in institutions. Finally, we draw together the conclusions from these analyses, which help to identify the proper balance in the design of transparency reforms and provide empirical support for a multi-pronged approach to institutional and legislative recognition of whistleblowing.

BACKGROUND: TRANSPARENCY, TRUST AND WHISTLEBLOWING

Transparency and Trust

Together, the ever-intensifying pace of technological change and the increasingly global nature of the information society explain why transparency has become such a powerful call in public policy and law reform. Pope's allusions to the relationship between the ability to see and know as

much as possible about the nature of decision-making, and trust in the institutions through which most decision-making occurs, is underscored by Frank Vogl, a co-founder of Transparency International:

> The new age of transparency, in which more people than ever before can learn all manner of things from all manner of places at minimal cost and with amazing speed, is transformative: a relatively narrow path peopled with academics and members of the establishment concerned with anticorruption is now giving way to a vast boulevard named mass public engagement.

Whether out of concern for corruption or for good governance and corporate responsibility more broadly, there is a natural synergy between increased transparency and democratic empowerment. As a result, transparency is often presented in public discourse as a one-way street – as though we were always destined to have more of it, and that this must always represent a good thing. Moreover, over the last 40 years, this growth in capacities and demands for transparency has coincided with a general pattern of declining popular trust in the institutions of government, even in 'advanced' democracies.[5] Figure 2.1 demonstrates this trend, for example, using confidence of US citizens in their Congress.

Due to this coincidence, it is easy to read rising demands for transparency as a response to declining trust. However, the relationship is plainly more complex: greater transparency itself has likely fuelled distrust. This causal relationship may be direct, in that transparency has made the public increasingly aware of closed decision-making processes that do not embody democratic ideals. However, it may also be indirect, with transparency simply part of the growing expectations of citizens and demands upon governments, which the modern information society also encourages.

% Great deal/Quite a lot of confidence

Source: Gallup International[6]

Figure 2.1   Americans' confidence in Congress (1973–2013)

Accordingly, the growing proportion of 'critical citizens' may be subject to a variety of interpretations. Growing tensions between democratic ideals and the perceived performance of institutions can be seen either as destabilizing or as 'healthy' trends 'if they fuel pressure for major institutional reforms designed to strengthen representative and direct democracy'.[7]

In this chicken-and-egg relationship, transparency is both a window on to reasons for declining trust, and perhaps a contributing cause, as well as part of the answer, providing opportunities and incentives for political and policy change. Within the evolution of democracy, forms of transparency once regarded as ground breaking are now taken for granted – such as public and media access to parliaments, or citizens' rights to access official information that relates to them. But is the institutionalization of transparency a total solution to the problem of declining trust in the manner suggested by some advocates? Or could such heavy reliance on transparency simply fuel ever-higher unmet expectations and hence more distrust?

Problems with Transparency?

To help answer these broad questions and discern the value of transparency more precisely, at least three more specific questions arise about the ways that transparency interrelate with public trust. Each is made particularly salient by whistleblowing reforms.

First, even in the most educated and technologically equipped society, there will always be limits to the ability and willingness of citizens to engage with all information relevant to the decision-making processes that affect them. While citizen demands for greater access and control over information are real and evolving, natural limits can be seen in a range of ways. For example, in health care, the push from doctor-controlled medical information toward patient-controlled health information is a significant development.[8] But as with individual use of freedom of information laws around the world, there is evidence that opportunities to access and control health records become less heavily subscribed over time, post-introduction.[9] On a different scale, the whistleblowing publisher WikiLeaks commenced operation with an objective to publish most if not all the information it received, under the assumption that this itself would represent a positive step in public discourse. Within a relatively short period of time, however, WikiLeaks reverted to a more traditional model of giving publication priority to the information that its editors considered most important.

Without such control, untrammelled transparency exacerbates the problem of information overload. This problem can be seen as chronic, particularly in advanced democracies.[10] Time and capacity to find and

interpret the most pertinent information are in short supply. Indeed, being swamped with information may do little to build public trust in institutions if citizens are not equipped with the ability to sort the information 'chaff'. Information overload may feed rather than discredit conspiracy theories about the perversion of institutions.[11] Even among less paranoid citizens, information overload may confuse and alienate rather than empower. While the public enjoys the security of knowing that opportunities for openness exist, this security may not necessarily rely on the opportunities actually being utilized or realized. This is not an argument for reducing transparency, but is one for understanding its context.

Second, transparency reforms often remain politically contested – contrary to accounts that 'defenders of secrecy are in retreat', as if the desirability of maximum transparency has now won widespread policy consensus.[12] This resistance is perhaps the clearest reminder that even though transparency is often presented as a principle that is 'overarching, non-interventionist and straightforward', its implementation and application are actually 'anything but'.[13] Even when regimes or power-holders have no *specific* reason to oppose transparency – such as where it would expose clear misdeeds – they can be prone to resist it. The tendency was captured famously in the British television series 'Yes, Minister', in which the permanent secretary Sir Arnold Robinson opined that 'open government' was a 'contradiction in terms: you can be open or you can have government'.[14] As a result of normal institutional self-interest, the policy opposition to particular transparency reforms is often likely to be more focused and powerful than the diffuse public interests supporting the principle.[15]

Such policy contestation gains particular traction where greater transparency results in a greater focus on failures in institutions. Such failures are the typical focus of whistleblowing. Especially where the vehicle for transparency is a competitive media market, democracies face the enduring problem that evidence of organizational wrongdoing is more likely to garner public attention than evidence of organizational integrity and performance. Yet disproportionate reporting of the bad over the good may contribute to further erosion of public trust.[16] Without some basis for when it should occur, the uncontrolled release of every suspicion, accusation or confirmation of wrongdoing risks can create the impression that organizations are generally corrupt even when they are not.

This tension lies at the heart of Braithwaite's description of how in modern societies, we now often 'enculturate' and justify trust in institutions by deliberately institutionalizing *dis*trust.[17] Whistleblower protection is one such method, given that it aims to encourage the reporting of wrongdoing for the purpose of rooting it out, and so ensuring that the institutions involved are functioning with integrity or are returned to a

desired state of trustworthiness. However, achieving Braithwaite's principle relies on a degree of proportionality, which would seem challenged by maximum or unlimited release of information about alleged wrongdoing.

Thirdly, and consequently, there are logical limits not only to how much direct access citizens can manage to information about the inner workings of institutions, or should have, but how much they really want. On one hand, popular demand for access to information can reflect people's desire to empower themselves, to assess whom 'they can trust in power', and rely less on 'the experts' to interpret information, all of which technology has enabled across a set of disciplines. On this account, transparency reforms can be seen as reflecting a lack of full trust in government to behave as a true agent of the people, and affording political capacity to citizens to circumvent the normal processes of bureaucracies, legislatures and other institutions.[18]

At the same time, it is unclear that societies can continue to function if normal governing institutions require continual, mass subversion by releasing all information. When it comes to rectification of wrongdoing, trust would also still seem to rely on citizens having confidence that if institutions act improperly, official processes will be triggered to address such improper actions, and so keep individual citizens from bearing the burden of confronting the causes of distrust or having always to take direct action to secure alternative solutions. There is thus a tension between transparency reform aimed to compensate for a presumed untrustworthiness of institutions, and transparency reform aimed at supporting many citizens' desires to have institutions that they can trust.

These issues do not undermine the importance of transparency. They reinforce the complexity of the relationship between transparency and trust, and challenge the idea that transparency per se can ever substitute for trust – as opposed to contribute to it. Given these issues, the question becomes, 'How do we know when a particular transparency reform is contributing to trust rather than undermining it?'

Whistleblowing

As noted, policies aimed at encouraging whistleblowing provide fruitful terrain for exploring the relationship between transparency and trust. Over the past 20 years, such reform has become a central part of the transparency, anti-corruption and open government landscape.[19] Whistleblowing also provides a concrete test of the challenges involved in shaping transparency reforms. It directly provokes the tension between presumptions in favour of maximum transparency and the presumption that trust is best maintained by those institutions retaining informational control.

On one side of this debate, some argue that whistleblowing can only be effective – and indeed, should only be recognised as whistleblowing – if it takes its most transparent form: disclosure of wrongdoing to the wider public, typically through the media.[20] Anything less, such as internal whistleblowing within organizations or regulatory whistleblowing to other institutions, is seen as ineffective, either because negative attitudes towards whistleblowing will mean that no one will listen, or because the whistleblower will be crushed by reprisals for no gain. Similarly, journalists may argue that whistleblowing policies are only legitimate if they permit organizational insiders to disclose wrongdoing to the media as a 'first port of call' when needed, consistently with the transparency function of a free media – that of seeking to expose whatever it is that powerful persons might try to keep secret.[21] From both perspectives, the objectives of whistleblowing are seen as served by the maximum transparency.

At the other extreme, since the value of whistleblowing began to be officially recognized, a reverse position has often been taken by institutional custodians. Far from public whistleblowing being most effective and desirable, trust in these institutions is seen as best served by legitimizing only internal and regulatory whistleblowing, on the basis that official institutions are the best placed to deal with the wrongdoing alleged. Such a viewpoint would render it unnecessary for wrongdoing to always or easily be aired publicly, and so avoid the negative impacts on organizational morale and public confidence. Instead, it may be better to promote a form of very limited transparency – almost 'counter transparency' – in which efforts will be made to support and protect the whistleblower only as long as they stay inside official channels and observe strong secrecy and confidentiality obligations.

This tension can be seen in the limited take-up, to date, of statutory whistleblowing regimes which embrace a 'three-tiered model' – with protections covering, first, internal whistleblowing, then 'regulatory' whistleblowing to external official agencies, and third, to the general public through the media.[22] Here, Australia and the UK provide illustrative examples. In 1994, the state of New South Wales was one of the first jurisdictions worldwide to incorporate all three tiers in its whistleblower protection law, now called the Public Interest Disclosures Act; by 2013, five out of Australia's nine jurisdictions have done so.[23] The UK included all three tiers in its Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. However, the jurisdiction is partial even in the UK; in Australia, four states have resisted the model; and in all cases, there remains much debate and uncertainty about when each tier should be accessed.[24] In Queensland, Australia, public whistleblowing was rejected in 1994, and only recognized in 2010 – and even then, senior integrity regulators still describe the regime as 'essentially' an internal process, not a public

one: 'whistleblowing legislation does not contribute to external integrity processes but can assist the internal integrity processes of the executive government'.[25]

Is one approach more correct than the other? Even if a three-tiered model including public whistleblowing is adopted, what should be the availability of each tier? When should insiders be entitled to disclose organisational wrongdoing to the media with official protection? What is most conducive to sustaining public trust? The answers provide insight into not only the design of whistleblowing policies, but the relation between transparency and trust more generally.

ATTITUDES TO TRANSPARENCY AND WHISTLEBLOWING

To explore these questions, we surveyed the attitudes of random national samples of adults in Australia (n=1211) and the UK (n=2000), together with a large self-selected sample of individuals (n=2622) from a range of countries through the first World Online Whistleblowing Survey (WOWS).[26] The questions were developed for the WOWS, through review of previous instruments, interviews with whistleblowers and media representatives across a range of countries, and consultation within the International Whistleblowing Research Network including a meeting at Seattle University in March 2012.

The full WOW Survey consisted of 41 questions, with ten of these questions used in the Australian and UK random sample surveys, plus demographic questions in each case. The Australian and UK surveys thus afford a statistically representative snapshot of these populations, which share comparable political, institutional and legal traditions, in addition to the specific history of whistleblowing law reform discussed above. The longer self-selected survey enables comparison of individuals on a variety of extra attributes and attitudes, especially whether the respondents (1) had seen organizational wrongdoing and blown the whistle (whistleblowers, n=745), (2) had not seen wrongdoing but said they would have blown the whistle if they did (potential whistleblowers, n=1,538), or (3) had either seen wrongdoing but not blown the whistle, or said they would not blow the whistle even if they were to see wrongdoing (non-whistleblowers, n=329; total, n=2622).

From the discussion above, we were interested in four issues:

● Do citizens support the need for greater transparency?
● Do citizens value and support whistleblowing?

● Do citizens support the most 'transparent' form of whistleblowing, being whistleblowing to the media or general public, and under what conditions?
● How does citizen support for transparency and whistleblowing relate to citizens' attitudes toward trust in institutions?

This section presents results on the first three issues, while the fourth is dealt with below. The full wording of the seven survey items used to analyse these issues is set out in the Appendix. Question 1 introduced key concepts of transparency and whistleblowing in a non-leading way, by defining the type of 'inside information' with which all of the questions were concerned:

'*Inside information*' is information that someone has because of his or her role in an organisation – for example, as an employee of a government department or a business, or as a member of an educational, religious or community organisation. Often, inside information is secret or confidential for good reason. However, just as often, it is also about important matters going on within the organisation.

Do Citizens Support the Need for Greater Transparency?

In response to Question 1, Table 2.1 presents the proportion of respondents who thought that too much, not enough, or the right amount of information was kept secret in organizations in their society. In both countries, opinion was evenly divided between those who felt that too much information was kept secret (Australia 50 per cent; UK 53 per cent) and those with a different view or who could not say. In the WOWS sample, the overwhelming majority of respondents (86 per cent) felt that too much information is kept secret, but this stands to reason, highlighting the difference between the general population and those motivated to self-select for such a survey. Interestingly however, among this sample, neither actual whistleblowers nor potential whistleblowers were any more likely than non-whistleblowers, nor each other, to feel there is too much secrecy.

The representative results from Australia and the UK confirm that a perceived need for greater transparency is an important issue in the public mind, given that those who feel there is too much secrecy on the part of organisations outnumber those who feel the balance is right by about two-to-one. Notwithstanding the challenges of information overload in such countries, noted earlier, the strength of support for greater transparency helps to explain why reforms in this direction are so politically salient. At the same time, transparency is still a variable issue. While around half the respondents considered there should be more transparency, a small

Table 2.1 Information secrecy in organizations (%) (Q1)

Statement	Australia (n=1211)	UK (n=2000)	World Online Whistleblowing Survey (WOWS)			
			Whistleblowers (n=745)	Potential w/blowers (n=1548)	Non-w/blowers (n=329)	Total (n=2622)
a. In [my country], **too much** information is kept secret in organizations	49.5	53.4	85.6	85.5	85.4	85.5
b. In [my country], **about the right amount** of information is kept secret in organizations	25.8	22.4	8.5	10.6	9.4	9.8
c. In [my country], **not enough** information is kept secret in organizations	6.9	8.1	3.0	1.2	3.3	1.9
d. Can't say	17.8	16.1	3.0	2.8	1.8	2.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

proportion (7–8 per cent) considered there to be too much. Also, in addition to the quarter of respondents who trusted that the balance is right, a significant proportion (Australia 18 per cent; UK 16 per cent) could not say. Apart from those who genuinely felt they did not know, or that the question was too broad, this group might be interpreted as unconvinced that present levels of transparency are sufficient; or alternatively, and more likely, as simply not sufficiently concerned about the issue to state a view one way or another.

Do Citizens Value and Support Whistleblowing?

If transparency is a live issue, do citizens value or support whistleblowing as a specific transparency mechanism? This question is pertinent because on many accounts, whistleblowing is not popularly supported by the political culture of the societies in question – or perhaps any society. Presumptions that whistleblowing goes against norms of organizational and peer group loyalty, and attracts heavy negative official responses from organizations or authorities, mean that its acceptability is challenged in many societies, including Australia and the UK.[27]

Table 2.2, answering Q3, presents the surprise result that in both Australia and the UK, overwhelming majorities (81 per cent in both cases) support whistleblowing as defined by the surveys. Indeed, this proportion is substantially higher than those who feel there is too much secrecy. At the same time, the results confirm the mismatch between the *actual* level of popular recognition and the same citizens' perceptions of how they *think* their society views whistleblowing. The proportion of respondents who viewed their society as accepting of whistleblowing was much lower (Q2: Australia 53 per cent; UK 47 per cent). This mismatch helps to explain why legal reform to recognize and protect whistleblowers, like transparency generally, is a political issue. Indeed, it is a more acute issue than that of secrecy in general, given that whistleblowing also raises other issues such as injustice.

Notwithstanding this recognition of the value of whistleblowing, Table 2.3 confirms that perceived value may vary significantly – for example, depending upon who is the target of the act of whistleblowing. Significant differences emerge between Australia and the UK, in terms of the perceived acceptability of blowing the whistle on persons in charge of organizations (Australia 81 per cent; UK 71 per cent), notwithstanding that both remain high. This contrast may be owed to differences in these nations' political cultures (e.g. deference to authority), notwithstanding their related political heritage.[28] In both countries, however, there remains a common, lower perceived acceptability of blowing the whistle on family or friends, confirming that issues of social loyalty remain in play.

Table 2.2 Support for whistleblowing (%) (Q3)

Statement	Australia (n=1211)	UK (n=2000)	World Online Whistleblowing Survey (WOWS)			
			Whistleblowers (n=745)	Potential w/blowers (n=1548)	Non-w/blowers (n=329)	Total (n=2622)
a. People should be **supported** for revealing serious wrongdoing, even if it means revealing inside information	81.3	81.2	95.7	96.1	92.7	95.5
b. People who reveal inside information should be **punished**, even if they are revealing serious wrongdoing	8.5	6.0	1.3	1.2	4.6	1.7
c. Neither / Don't know	10.2	12.8	3.0	2.7	2.7	2.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2.3 Acceptability of whistleblowing in particular circumstances (Q4)

How **acceptable** do you personally think it is for someone to reveal inside information about serious wrongdoing by each of these different **types of people**?

Percentage responding 'acceptable'. Serious wrongdoing by:	Australia (n=1211)	UK (n=2000)	World Online Whistleblowing Survey (WOWS)			
			Whistleblowers (n=745)	Potential w/blowers (n=1548)	Non-w/blowers (n=329)	Total (n=2622)
A **People in charge** of an organization	81.1 %	71.1 %	95.4 %	97.5 %	92.4 %	96.3 %
B **Other staff or workers** in an organization	76.8 %	69.6 %	90.9 %	87.0 %	79.6 %	87.1 %
C A **family** member or personal **friend** working in the **organization**	59.8 %	59.4 %	70.5 %	62.5 %	57.8 %	64.1 %

The WOWS data confirm these issues across all groups, there being significantly greater support for whistleblowing against persons in charge than for family or friends, even among actual whistleblowers. Either these whistleblowers began with a higher sense of responsibility to report, irrespective of the identity of wrongdoers, or have been influenced by their experience to take that view. By contrast, individuals who are only potential whistleblowers or non-whistleblowers are increasingly similar to the two population samples, with 63 and 58 per cent respectively considering it acceptable to blow the whistle on family or friends (compared with 60 and 59 per cent of the Australian and UK samples).

Do Citizens Support the Most 'Transparent' Form of Whistleblowing, Being Whistleblowing to the Media or General Public, and Under What Conditions?

As noted earlier, the ultimate or most transparent form of whistleblowing involves disclosure to the general public, through the media. Does strong support for whistleblowing (at least against persons in authority) and relatively strong demand for greater transparency, flow into support for public whistleblowing, in particular?

Table 2.4 shows, similarly to the Table 2.1 results on secrecy, that the answer is more complex than either of the opposing positions noted earlier would allow. In response to the question of *when* a whistleblower should be entitled to go to the media, ranging from 'as a first option' to 'never', the overall question of whether public whistleblowing has popular legitimacy is resolved in the affirmative. In both countries, an overwhelming majority (Australia 87 per cent, UK 88 per cent) see it as potentially acceptable for a whistleblower to use the media *at some stage*. These results help to explain why three-tiered models of whistleblower protection, including public whistleblowing, have achieved political support in these countries, even against competing values and institutional opposition.

At the same time, the results show the perceived value of this form of transparency to vary, depending on the circumstances. Within the substantial support, respondents were fairly evenly divided between those who considered that the media should be used either 'as a first option, in any situation' or 'whenever there become specific reasons to do so' (Australia 41 per cent, UK 43 per cent); as against 'only as a last resort, if all else fails' (Australia 46 per cent, UK 44 per cent). In particular, 10 per cent or fewer considered that whistleblowers should be entitled to use the media 'as a first option, in any situation' – that is, as of right, or as always the most ideal form of disclosure.

From this, the position of maximum transparency supported by some

Table 2.4 When should whistleblowing to the media be acceptable? (%) (Q10)

If someone in an organization has inside information about serious wrongdoing, when do you think they should be able to use a journalist, the media, or the internet to draw attention to it?	Australia (n=1211)	UK (n=2000)	World Online Whistleblowing Survey (WOWS)			
			Whistleblowers (n=745)	Potential w/ blowers (n=1548)	Non-w/blowers (n=329)	Total (n=2622)
a. As a first option, in any situation	6.8	9.5	6.8	5.1	5.5	5.6
b. Whenever there become specific reasons to do so	34.4	33.8	47.4	57.0	55.3	54.0
c. Only as a last resort, if all else fails	46.0	44.3	42.3	34.0	27.4	35.5
d. Never	4.8	4.6	2.0	1.0	4.6	1.7
e. Don't know	8.0	7.7	1.5	2.9	7.3	3.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

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advocates can be seen to be in tension with popular preference and political culture. Indeed, the self-selected WOWS data show striking results. These self-selecting respondents were no more likely than the general population to support whistleblowing to media 'as a first option' (6 per cent), notwithstanding their much higher demand for transparency and higher support for whistleblowing. In fact, whistleblowers were particularly circumspect about the value of going to the media early. While the whole sample was more likely to believe that the media should be approached whenever there became 'specific reasons to do so' (54 per cent), this was least true of whistleblowers (47 per cent), who were also the most likely to believe that the media should be used 'only as a last resort, if all else fails' (42 per cent). It appears that many whistleblowers have either had bad experiences when going to the media or found the route to be ineffective, or in any event, believe that other avenues should be trusted first – the question to which we return in the next section.

These results confirm that contrary to either extreme, the public's interest in the transparency value of whistleblowing is relative and nuanced. In the public mind, trust is served no more effectively by maximum transparency, in all circumstances at all times, than by keeping all disclosures within the official institutions to which they relate. Even when there is support for reform, transparency is valued differently depending on when and how it is achieved. When it comes to disclosure of inside information about suspected wrongdoing, these results may explain why whistleblowing policies that engage with the reality of these diverse circumstances – such as through three-tiered models – appear to have public support and political salience. They may also assist further in the design and implementation of such reforms, especially when the message is shared by whistleblowers themselves.

POLITICAL TRUST

Before exploring the utility of these findings, we return to our overall query regarding whether transparency does, or can, function as a substitute for public trust in political institutions. We have established that transparency is more complex than appears at first glance. Given that citizens support whistleblowing, including to the media, but not necessarily as the default or optimum step, can we draw further conclusions about how support for transparency and whistleblowing relate to trust in institutions?

The data facilitate a direct examination of this relationship by allowing us to differentiate between respondents according to their overall level of trust in current institutions – and so identify factors that, by

association, may help to explain what sustains or erodes trust and what roles transparency and whistleblowing play in this process.

We see two of the survey questions as indicators of political trust. Question 1, which asked whether the right amount of information is kept secret in organizations, also allows us to distinguish between (1) those who are most trusting of institutions ('not enough information' currently kept secret), (2) those who consider the amount to be right, (3) those who don't know, and (4) those with lowest trust (too much secrecy) (here we also label this variable T1). A further question asked respondents to whom they considered it was most effective to report serious wrongdoing, in their society, in order to take action to stop it (Q9, which we label T2). Responses range from 'to people in authority via the official channels' (highest trust), through traditional media ('journalists or news organizations') and new media ('directly to the general public via internet, Twitter, Facebook or online blogs') to 'none of the above – in [my society] there is no effective way to get action' (lowest trust).

While these two variables serve as, at best, proxies or indicators of trust, they accord with the two-dimensional understanding of political or institutional trust, measured by most empirical scholars. Where Q1/T1 serves to measure trust in institutions in a relatively diffuse sense, Q9/T2 measures trust in the more specific sense of institutional responsiveness to wrongdoing.[29] Equally, therefore, Q1/T1 relates to a feeling of inclusion (pertaining to harmony-based trust or communal norms), while Q9/T2 rests on a perception of competence (security-based trust or exchange norms).[30]

Tables 2.5 and 2.6 thus show the degree of correlation between respondents' levels of trust as measured by these two variables, and their responses to the other questions in the survey, converted into scales – Table 2.5 for the representative population samples (Australia and UK combined) and Table 2.6 for the WOWS sample. In both cases, there was a positive, if low, correlation between our two indicators (Table 2.5, $\rho=.116$; Table 2.6, $\rho=.172$), allowing us to see them as measuring dimensions of trust that are different, yet go hand in hand.

The other questions used, reported on above, relate to the perceived social acceptability and respondent's own support for whistleblowing (Q2 and Q3, which we also label WB1 and WB2); Question 10 concerning when whistleblowers should be able to go to the media (WB3); and respondents' personal views on the acceptability of blowing the whistle on different types of people (Q4, which we label WB4). Finally, an additional question is used regarding respondents' sense of personal obligation to report, confidence in management response if they did report, and perception of whether their management would be serious about protecting them (Q6, which we label WB5). In examining the correlations between answers

Table 2.5 Spearman's Rho (ρ) correlations for Australia-UK sample (n=3,211)

	T1 (Q1)	T2 (Q9)	WB1 (Q2)	WB2 (Q3)	WB3 (Q10)
T1 (Q1)	1.000				
T2 (Q9)	**.116****	1.000			
WB1 (Q2)	**.175****	**.163****	1.000		
WB2 (Q3)	**.185****	−.019	.018	1.000	
WB3 (Q10)	**.110****	**.219****	−.009	−.037	1.000
WB4a (Q4a)	**−.171****	.008	.061	**−.260****	−.028
WB4b (Q4b)	**−.158****	.016	.067	**−.239****	−.029
WB4c (Q4c)	−.106**	−.005	.071	**−.195****	−.022
WB5a (Q6a)	−.076	**.124****	.075	**−.113****	.077*
WB5b (Q6b)	.109**	**.237****	**.168****	.019	.073*
WB5c (Q6c)	.111**	**.231****	**.178****	.018	.071*

*p<.01 ** p<.001

Table 2.6 Spearman's Rho (ρ) correlations for WOWS-sample (n=2,622)

	T1 (Q1)	T2 (Q9)	WB1 (Q2)	WB2 (Q3)	WB3 (Q10)
T1 (Q1)	1.000				
T2 (Q9)	**.172****	1.000			
WB1 (Q2)	**.105****	**.156****	1.000		
WB2 (Q3)	**.311****	.049*	.082**	1.000	
WB3 (Q10)	**.198****	**.174****	.023	**.184****	1.000
WB4a (Q4a)	**−.231****	−.074**	−.011	**−.330****	**−.181****
WB4b (Q4b)	**−.166****	−.101**	−.058**	**−.219****	**−.159****
WB4c (Q4c)	**−.122****	−.091**	−.066**	**−.173****	**−.142****
WB5a (Q6a)	−.061**	.029	−.022	−.065**	−.024
WB5b (Q6b)	.094**	**.231****	**.178****	.066**	.047*
WB5c (Q6c)	.089**	**.167****	**.172****	.048*	.019

*p<.01 ** p<.001

across these questions, we treated all variables as ordinal, and hence calculated Spearman's Rho rather than Pearson's correlation. In examining correlations in the Australia-UK sample, we also tested for the association between demographic variables and levels of trust. There was no significant difference between the countries – meaning that our conclusions below regarding the relationship between transparency, whistleblowing

and trust hold in both contexts. Perceptions of trust also did not vary significantly according to the gender, household income, education level or work status (full time/part time/none) of respondents – a remarkable result suggesting that extent of political trust as measured here does not depend on belonging to a particular social or economic group within these societies. Age was the only variable to correlate slightly negatively with trust in organisations as measured by T1 (ρ=-.140, p<.001) indicating that life experience impacts on trust. Older people tended to feel there is too much secrecy, while the younger the respondent, the more trusting he or she tended to be.

With regard to the role of whistleblowing in trust, our findings suggest the following.

Trust and Whistleblowing

First, we noted earlier that most people support whistleblowing even though only around half have low trust in an organization's control of information. This contrast is important, because whistleblowing is by definition about exposing wrongdoing, and is especially supported where organizational leaders are responsible for the wrongdoing. The mixed results in Table 2.5 confirm, however, that support for this form of transparency is not necessarily based in low trust in organizations. On the first trust measure, there were strong correlations between low trust in organizational transparency and the acceptability of blowing the whistle on people in charge of organizations (ρ=-.171), and to a lesser extent on colleagues (ρ=-.158). These correlations confirm that for those who perceive secrecy as problematic, people in authority are the most important 'target' of whistleblowing; and so whistleblowing does appear to have an especially political purpose and dimension among those with lower trust. On the second trust measure, however, this result did not repeat. Those with lower trust in the competence of institutions to remedy wrongdoing did not see any particular type or target of whistleblowing as more important than another.

Instead, overall, there was a strong positive correlation between respondents' general support for whistleblowing, and their trust in institutions' handling of secrecy/disclosure (ρ=.185). This correlation suggests that people support whistleblowing for reasons other than, or in addition to, beliefs that there are too many secrets or not enough information is being revealed; it is not distrust which is driving this particular demand. There is also no sign that support for whistleblowing stems from low trust in the competence of institutions to remedy wrongdoing, there being no significant correlation either way (ρ=-.019).

In fact, whistleblowing appears to be valued more strongly by those with higher trust in institutions than those who are suspicious of them. As also noted earlier, a higher proportion of citizens believe that whistleblowers should be supported than those who believe their society is accepting of whistleblowing, resulting in no significant correlation between these views (ρ=.018). There is a strong correlation, however, between higher trust and perceptions that whistleblowing is acceptable in society – on both trust measures (T1, ρ=.175; T2, ρ=.163). In other words, rather than being a compensation or substitute for trust, whistleblowing appears to be valued as part of the 'trust landscape' itself. Respondents who see their society as accepting of whistleblowing also tend to think that institutions can be trusted to deal with wrongdoing and to get the secrecy/disclosure balance right.

Of course, citizen trust may be misplaced on any or all of these fronts. But rightly or wrongly, more trusting citizens appear to see whistleblowing as one of the processes that contribute to trust: they tend to believe not only that whistleblowers *should* be supported, but that they actually are supported. Table 2.6 shows this pattern was repeated even among the self-selected WOWS sample, despite its overwhelmingly lower level of trust on the secrecy measure. These results reveal a very similar thrust for the cor-relations between trust and attitudes to whistleblowing, in some cases the correlations being only stronger (ρ=.219).

These results help to explain how transparency assists in sustaining trust, rather than acting as a substitute or compensation for a lack of trust. Citizens appear to value whistleblowing, not necessarily because they are suspicious or distrustful of institutions overall, or believe too much is being hidden from them, or that institutions are thoroughly corrupt and getting it *all* wrong. Rather, it seems that most citizens have faith that if things *do* go wrong, responses will be triggered which can allow institu-tional self-correction, with whistleblowing's role in this recognized. These data provide strong support for Braithwaite's account of the way in which modern political systems 'institutionalise distrust' (such as by according social, political and legal value to whistleblowing) in order to 'enculturate trust' in institutions as a whole.[31] They show how, paradoxically, whistle-blowing policies that may seem predicated on negative assumptions that institutions cannot be trusted, in fact also reflect a positive desire to trust those institutions, and help sustain that trust.

Whistleblowing to the Media

As noted earlier, citizens are largely divided as to whether public whistle-blowing should be allowed (1) 'as a first option', (2) as soon as reasons

justify, (3) or only as a 'last resort', with a small percentage of respondents believing it is never justified. Table 2.5 reveals that while the role of whistleblowing overall tends to correlate more with higher trust than lower trust, the question of when this 'ultimate' transparency step should be available is also directly influenced by trust. Respondents with higher trust in institutions were significantly more cautious about whether or when whistleblowing to the media should occur – both on the first trust measure (ρ=.110), and especially on the second measure, if they had higher confidence in the competence of official channels and authorities to remedy reported wrongdoing (ρ=.219). These results stand to reason. Lower trust does drive support for whistleblowing to the media sooner rather than later, even if trust is not overwhelmingly low across society.

We also saw earlier in Table 2.4 that the self-selected respondents in the WOWS sample, and especially the whistleblowers, were also relatively cautious as to when whistleblowing to the media should occur. On both trust measures, the WOWS respondents also showed lower trust than the general population samples, with the most trusting being the potential whistleblowers. These results are consistent with the fact that these respondents said they would blow the whistle but had never actually seen any wrongdoing, no doubt helping to sustain their slightly higher trust.

What explains this somewhat unexpected result? Table 2.7 shows the relationship between support for going to the media early, and trust, by showing separate results for each of the three groups: whistleblowers, potential whistleblowers, and non-whistleblowers.

On the first trust measure, there is a strong negative correlation across the board, shedding little further light. However differences on the second trust measure are more revealing. The correlation between trust in institutions to stop wrongdoing, and going to the media early, is strongest among potential whistleblowers, and less strong among actual whistleblowers, with no significant correlation among non-whistleblowers. This suggests that potential whistleblowers share their high trust in institutions across the board; they trust in official channels but also believe that the media should be accessed as early as necessary. In other words, their belief that the media should be accessed is not driven by distrust in those official channels. While those with actual whistleblowing experience are more circumspect, the fact that their views tend in the same direction reinforces this conclusion. 'High trust whistleblowers' are clearly in the minority, but their experience suggests they recognize the high *potential* impact of going to the media early, while also believing that trust should be placed in other institutions. Many whistleblowers (34 per cent, the single largest group) do consider media exposure to be the most effective way to get action on wrongdoing, even though even more (at least 44 per cent) consider that

Table 2.7   Spearman's Rho (ρ) correlations for WOWS sample (divided)

	Whistle-blowers (n=745)	Potential whistleblowers (n=1548)	Non-whistleblowers (n=329)
	WB3 (Q10)	WB3 (Q10)	WB3 (Q10)
T1 (Q1)	−.210**	−.209**	−.183**
T2 (Q9)	−.173**	−.229**	−.043

*p<.01 ** p<.001

official channels should be tried first, or should be the only channels used. These views are not necessarily inconsistent. What they reinforce, once again, is that even when maximum transparency is recognized as valuable and coincides with higher trust, it does not substitute for trust.

Naive, Blind and Earned Trust

Finally, Table 2.5 suggests that citizen trust is influenced not only by general attitudes toward institutions and society in general, but by perceptions of the organizations in which people participate. Among the general population sample, respondents were more likely to perceive society as generally accepting of whistleblowing, if they had higher confidence that, in their own organization, action would be taken on reported wrongdoing (ρ=.168) and management was serious about protecting people who reported (ρ=.178). They were also more likely to have higher political trust, on both measures, but especially in terms of trust in people in authority to remedy wrongdoing (ρ=.237 and ρ=.231 respectively). This confirms Tyler's and Degoey's finding that the trustworthiness attributions that people make are robust across different contexts.[32] The trust we have and the transparency we see in the organizations of which we are members is reflected in the trust and transparency we perceive in the wider society.

On the other hand, respondents who perceived society to be generally accepting of whistleblowing did not necessarily feel more personally obliged to raise concerns themselves about wrongdoing. Perhaps this is an indicator of blind trust: people may be sufficiently convinced that institutions behave well, that if wrongdoing did occur in their own organization, they cannot imagine themselves needing to do anything about it.

The same results obtained for the self-selected WOWS sample.

In Table 2.5, there was also no correlation between trust in organizations' handling of information and sense of personal obligation to blow the whistle within an organization. However, the higher the respondent's

trust in people in authority to remedy wrongdoing, the stronger the sense of obligation (even if only slightly so: $\rho=.124$). This result, combined with the above ones, reinforces the subtle ways in which whistleblowing works as a transparency and accountability mechanism. More precisely, trust seems more likely to be sustained, and citizens more likely to blow the whistle, if reforms are put in place to ensure that action is taken and support and protection are provided when the whistle is blown. By contrast, simply making employees subject to personal obligations to blow the whistle seems less likely to earn trust. The results resonate with arguments that trust depends on attitudes about the procedural justice of authorities and beliefs about their legitimacy.[33]

Trust, and the role of whistleblowing as a transparency mechanism, thus depends on more factors than transparency alone. In particular, these findings reinforce the salience of policies that recognize not only the third or 'back-up' tier of whistleblowing to the media, but the role of internal and regulatory whistleblowing – even where counter to transparency in a pure form. It is the relation between different forms of disclosure that gives whistleblowing its impact, even when actual transparency is limited. For example, it may be that the advent of new media and sites such as WikiLeaks are making a greater contribution to the trustworthiness of institutions by forcing those institutions to be more responsive to internal concerns, than via any other impact on their conduct or behaviour.[34] Similarly, acceptance of the role of the media as a whistleblowing avenue can be seen as making 'a compelling case' for organizations to develop effective whistleblowing policies of their own; in the words of Bob Ansell, controls and compliance manager for Philip Morris Ltd, 'I would much rather people speak to me than a newspaper or *Today Tonight*'.[35]

While whistleblowing counts as a transparency reform *par excellence*, its contribution to public trust thus appears to revolve first and foremost around public confidence in the ability of institutions to respond to such information, often without wide public exposure, rather than around the revelation of scandals. While whistleblowing to the media forms part of this landscape, it is the potential that public whistleblowing may occur, more than the frequency with which it does, that helps institutions to earn and to sustain public trust.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter began with the question of whether transparency has become a substitute for trust in institutions, in an age where new forms of transparency are possible and in demand, and public trust in political institu-

tions is under pressure. We have shown the complexity of this question using evidence of public attitudes toward transparency, whistleblowing and public trust from representative population surveys in Australia and the UK, and a large self-selecting international sample of whistleblowers, potential whistleblowers and non-whistleblowers collected through the World Online Whistleblowing Survey (WOWS).

Concerns for greater transparency are real in the populations studied. Support for whistleblowing, as a transparency mechanism, is also much higher than often believed. In neither country, however, was support for whistleblowing particularly driven by distrust in institutions. At the population level and among the self-selected respondents, the results help to explain how transparency assists in sustaining trust rather than acting as a substitute or compensation for a lack of it. Citizens appear to value whistleblowing not necessarily because they are suspicious or distrustful of institutions overall, or believe too much is being hidden from them, or view institutions as being thoroughly corrupt. Rather, citizens value whistle-blowing because they have faith that if things *do* go wrong, responses will be triggered, and whistleblowing will play a part in this. These data provide support for Braithwaite's account of how modern political systems 'insti-tutionalise distrust' (such as by according value to whistleblowing) in order to 'enculturate trust' in institutions as a whole.

At the same time, these data challenge presumptions that maximum or unconstrained transparency is particularly conducive to sustaining public trust in institutions, just as it confirms that trust is not sustained simply by keeping all disclosures within the official institutions to which they relate. In the whistleblowing context, such presumptions were tested via attitudes regarding whether and when public whistleblowing (i.e. to the media) should occur. The data confirm that recognition of public whistle-blowing is a legitimate and necessary element of this form of transpar-ency. However, that reality is tempered by the value that citizens also place on the need for institutions to self-correct in response to wrongdoing, without maximum transparency in response to institutional wrongdoing *necessarily* presenting the optimum course.

These lessons were confirmed by the attitudes of whistleblowers them-selves. Many whistleblowers see the media as the most effective means of initiating action against wrongdoers in institutions, and they do so more strongly than the general populations studied. Yet even more strongly than the general population, self-selected whistleblower respondents only sup-ported whistleblowing to the media where official channels cannot be used or as a 'last resort'.

These analyses are useful not only in providing a more nuanced explana-tion of the relationship between transparency and public trust, but also in

helping to explain and inform the policy choices regarding whistleblowing as a transparency reform. We discussed trends in Australia and the UK towards a three-tiered model of whistleblowing, in which legislative protections and procedures allow – or even encourage – organizational members to disclose suspected wrongdoing internally, to regulatory authorities, or to the media. However, the trend remains contentious, and circumstances vary as to when each disclosure 'tier' should be available. Our results nevertheless explain why whistleblowing policies that engage with the reality of all three of these tiers, including effective definitions of when and why whistleblowing to the media will be protected, have public support and political salience. The data also confirms that general political trust in institutions is interrelated with trust in the specific organisations through which citizens live and work.

These insights into the relationship between transparency and trust show the importance of a multi-pronged approach, in which whistleblowing is made to work at all three levels. Public trust relies on increasing the responsibility of institutions to recognise and protect whistleblowers while also clarifying when they should be entitled to go public. Transparency clearly plays a crucial role in the maintenance of trust without actually substituting for it – a role which may require transparency to be limited, constrained and qualified in subtle terms. Understanding the relation between transparency and trust also provides greater clarity as to which thresholds for public disclosure may best align with public expectations, and hence supports policy responses that might best see public trust sustained.

NOTES

1. The research for this chapter was made possible by funding from Griffith University, University of Greenwich, and the Australian Research Council through Discovery Project DP1095696 (Griffith University and the University of Melbourne). The authors thank the funding institutions and their project team colleagues at the University of Melbourne, especially Reeva Lederman for useful suggestions; and thank Emma Osman for statistical analysis and support.
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3. Miceli, M. P. and Near, J. P. (1984) 'The relationships among beliefs, organisational position, and whistle-blowing status: A discriminant analysis', *Academy of Management Journal*, 27(4), 687–705, at 689.
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5. See e.g. Norris, P. (ed.) *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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11. See Sanders, T. and H West (eds), *Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of Suspicion in the New World Order* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).
12. Vogl, above note 2 at 20.
13. Fisher, E. (2010) 'Transparency and administrative law: A critical evaluation', 63 *Current Legal Problems* 272 at 273.
14. Sir Humphrey Appleby, 'Open Government' Episode of 'Yes Minister', BBC Television, 25 February 1980. In the same episode, the Government's Chief Whip hauls the Minister, Jim Hacker, over the coals for revealing too much in a speech. Hacker defends himself arguing, 'It's Open Government. It's in our manifesto. One of our main planks. The PM believes in Open Government too.' The Chief Whip responds tartly, 'Open, yes, but not **gaping**.'
15. Fung, A. and D. Weil, 'Open government and open society' in D. Lathrop and L. Ruma (eds.), *Open Government* (O'Reilly Media, 2010), 105 at 112.
16. Ibid at 106–7.
17. Braithwaite, J. 'Institutionalizing distrust, enculturating trust', in *Trust and Governance*, V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (eds) (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) at 343–75.
18. Vogl, above note 2 at 20: 'The citizens of many countries no longer accept the arrogant "trust us" claims of those who govern. Increasingly, people want to be able to judge for themselves about the degree to which they can trust those in power.' While true of some countries and some populaces, such as those that engaged in the 'Arab Spring' uprisings of 2011 described by Vogl, the question is whether this accurately describes how the value of transparency is perceived in all circumstances pertaining to corruption control.
19. Calland, R. and G. Dehn, (eds), *Whistleblowing Around the World – Law, Culture & Practice* (Public Concern At Work, London, 2004); Vandekerckhove, W., *Whistleblowing and Organizational Social Responsibility: A Global Assessment* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006); Lewis, D. (ed.), *A Global Approach to Public Interest Disclosure* (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 2010); Robert G. Vaughn, *The Successes and Failures of Whistleblower Laws* (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, 2013).
20. For a review of this debate, see Miceli, M. P, J. P. Near and T. M. Dworkin, *Whistleblowing in Organisations* (Routledge, 2008) at 7–10, 85.
21. See e.g. Oakes, L. *On the Record: Politics, Politicians and Power* (Hachette Australia, 2010) at 295–6; Fowler, A. *The Most Dangerous Man in the World: A Definitive Account Of Julian Assange And Wikileaks* (Melbourne University Press, 2011) at 236.
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23. Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW); since 2010, Public Interest Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA), as amended 2012; Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) (Austl.)
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(ed.), *Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector: Enhancing the theory and practice of internal witness management in public sector organisations* (Canberra: ANU E Press, 2008), at 261–88; Brown, A. J. (2009), 'Returning the Sunshine to the Sunshine State: Priorities for whistleblowing law reform in Queensland', *Griffith Law Review*, 18(3): 666–89; Brown, A. J. (2011), 'Weeding Out WikiLeaks (And Why It Won't Work): Legislative Recognition of Public Whistleblowing in Australia', *Global Media Journal (Australian Edition)* 5(1), http://www.commarts.uws.edu.au/gmjau/2011_5_1_toc.html.

25. Solomon, D. (Queensland Integrity Commissioner) (2012) 'What Is the Integrity Branch?', 70 *Australian Institute of Administrative Law Forum* 26 at 30.

26. The Australian data was collected by Newspoll Ltd for Griffith University in May 2012. The UK data was collected by ComRes for University of Greenwich in October 2012. The WOW Survey data was collected between May 2012 and April 2013 by Griffith University and University of Melbourne under Australian Research Council Discovery Project DP1095696; respondents were recruited through a range of mainstream and online media and civil society networks, and identified as residents of the following countries/regions: Australia (n=491), UK and Ireland (n=71), North America (n=146), Europe (predominantly Germany) (n=1774), missing (n=140). Full text of the WOW Survey questionnaire including the common items can be found at https:///whistleblow-ingsurvey.org. Analysis was conducted using SPSS.

27. For a discussion of the significance of this, see Vandekerckhove, W., T. Uys, M. Rehg and A. J. Brown, 'Understandings of whistleblowing: Dilemmas of societal culture' in A. J. Brown, D. Lewis, R. Moberly and W. Vandekerckhove (eds), *International Whistleblowing Research Handbook* (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, forthcoming, 2014).

28. For a more detailed analysis, see Vandekerckhove et al, ibid.

29. On distinctions between diffuse and specific factors in trust, see e.g. Easton, D. (1975) 'A re-assessment of the concept of political support', *British Journal of Political Science* 5(4): 435–57; Aydin, A. and C. I. Cenker (2012) 'Public confidence in government: empirical implications from a developing democracy.' *International Political Science Review* 33(2): 230–50; Doorenspleet, R. (2012) 'Critical citizens, democratic support and satisfaction in African democracies.' *International Political Science Review* 33(3): 279–300.

30. See Bowler, S. and T. Donovan (2002) 'Democracy, institutions and attitudes about citizen influence on government', *British Journal of Political Science* 32(2): 371–90; Braithwaite, V. 'Communal and exchange trust norms: Their value base and relevance to institutional trust', in V. Braithwaite and M. Levi (eds) *Trust and Governance* (Russell Sage Foundation, 1998) at 46–74; Metlay, D. 'Institutional trust and confidence: A journey into a conceptual quagmire', in G. Cvetkovich (ed.), *Social Trust and the Management of Risk* (London: Earthscan Publications, 1999) at 100–16; Weatherford, M. S. (1992):'Measuring political legitimacy', *The American Political Science Review* 86(1): 149–66.

31. See Braithwaite, note 17 above.

32. See Tyler, T. R. and P. Degoey, 'Trust in organizational authorities', in R. Kramer and T Tyler (eds) *Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and Research* (Sage, 1996) 331–56.

33. Ibid.

34. For an example of the direct impact of this increased transparency 'risk' in changing legal and organizational responses to wrongdoing, see House of Representatives 2009. *Whistleblower Protection: A Comprehensive Scheme for the Commonwealth Public Sector*. Canberra: Report of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia (25 February 2009), at 146.

35. As quoted in Leanne Mezrani, 'Cash rewards for whistleblowers cause concern', *Lawyers Weekly* (Australia), 2 May 2013 < http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/cash-rewards-for-whistleblowers-cause-concern-1>.

APPENDIX

World Online Whistleblowing Survey items used

Q1. 'Inside information' is information that someone has because of their role in an organization – for example, as an employee of a government department or a business, or as a member of an education, religious or community organization. Often inside information is secret or confidential, for good reason. However, often it is also about important things going on within the organization.

Which one of the following comes closest to your view? In [name of country / the society in which I live], <u>too much / about the right amount / not enough</u> information is kept secret in organizations.

Q2. Sometimes, inside information can be about **serious wrongdoing.** This is when a person or organization does things that are unlawful, unjust, dangerous or dishonest enough to harm the interests of individuals, the organization or wider society.

Which one of the following comes closest to your view? In [name of country / the society in which I live], it is generally <u>unacceptable / acceptable</u> for people to speak up about serious wrongdoing, if inside information would have to be revealed.

Q3. Which one of the following best describes what you think should happen in [my / name of country] society? '<u>People should be supported for revealing serious wrongdoing, even if it means revealing inside information / People who reveal inside information should be punished, even if they are revealing serious wrongdoing</u>.'

Q4. How acceptable do you personally think it is for someone to reveal inside information about serious wrongdoing by each of these different types of people? [Acceptable / unacceptable / neither or can't say]. To reveal inside information about:

   a. serious wrongdoing by people in charge of an organization?
   b. serious wrongdoing by other staff or workers in an organization?
   c. serious wrongdoing by a family member or personal friend working in the organization?

Q6. How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? [Agree / Disagree / neither or can't say]:

   a. If I observed wrongdoing, I would feel personally obliged to report it to someone in my organization.
   b. If I reported wrongdoing to someone in my organization, I am confident something appropriate would be done about it.

      c. Management in my organization is serious about protecting people who report wrongdoing.

Q9. In different societies, there are different views on the most effective way to get action to stop serious wrongdoing. Which one of these do you think is the most effective way in [your society / name of country]? By reporting the serious wrongdoing:

      a. people in authority via the official channels
      b. journalists or news organizations
      c. directly to the general public via internet, Twitter, Facebook or online blogs
      d. some other way
      e. none of the above – in [my society / name of country], there is no effective way to get action to stop serious wrongdoing.

Q10. If someone in an organization has inside information about serious wrongdoing, **when** do you think they should be able to use a journalist, the media, or the internet to draw attention to it?

      a. As a first option, in any situation
      b. Whenever there become specific reasons to do so
      c. Only as a last resort, if all else fails
      d. Never